Blossoms in the orchard

My previous post looked at the alleged treachery of Sir John Comyn of Badenoch, the so-called 'Red Comyn', at the battle of Falkirk in 1298. This one will focus on the equally controversial behaviour of the Welsh troops in Edward I's army. 

Most English chroniclers agree the Welsh were troublesome on this campaign, although the precise causes are uncertain. Walter of Guisborough wrote that the Welsh infantry rioted after Edward unwisely served them wine instead of water, and had to be dispersed by the king's household knights. The problem with Guisborough's account is that the inventory for the English supply ships has survived, and shows the vessels carried no wine.  

A more straightforward account is supplied by William of Rishanger. He wrote that, on the day of battle (22 July 1298), King Edward ordered the Welsh to attack the Scottish army, drawn up into four battalions or 'schiltrons': a classic Scottish hedgelog-like formation, each man holding his spear out and up, standing shoulder to shoulder with his comrades.

However, the Welsh refused. This, Rishanger claimed, was because of the long-standing hatred they bore towards Edward I. That is entirely believable, given that Edward had brutally conquered Wales in three punitive campaigns. The Welsh also (allegedly) believed that the Scots would have the victory, because they were much more numerous than the English.

Rishanger strikes a false note here. It is impossible to believe that William Wallace's army outnumbered that of Edward I: the king had raised almost 30,000 men for the Falkirk campaign, probably the largest army ever seen in the British Isles. Admittedly, we don't have such figures for the Scottish army, but ten thousand at most would be the limit.

Nevertheless, the reluctance of the Welsh to fight at Falkirk is a consistent theme in English chronicle accounts. It should be said they had shown no such reluctance in Flanders, only a few months previously, when Welsh troops butchered the French garrison at Damme and brawled with the Flemings, who were supposed to be their allies. Nor had they shown any fellow feeling for the Scots in 1296, when Welsh and Irish soldiers pillaged the Scottish Lowlands without mercy.

It may be the Welsh were simply fed up: Edward had summoned them to fight over and over again, without much reward. True, Welsh lords such as Gruffudd ap Rhys and Morgan ap Maredudd were well-paid for their services, but the infantry were clearly regarded as cheap and expendable. They generally received lower pay than their English counterparts (one penny a day instead of two) and were sometimes paid in bacon or flour, or whatever they could steal. 

There was a limit to Welsh defiance of the king. When it became clear the Scots were losing (wrote Rishanger) the Welsh suddenly rediscovered their warlike spirit and fell upon Wallace's men, slaughtering them until their bodies were strewn across the bloody battlefield, 'like blossoms in an orchard when the fruit has ripened'. 

Even so, Edward had learned his lesson. For the next Scottish campaign in 1300, the Welsh were excused 'on account of the great services they have done for us in the past'. Possibly this was the king's dry notion of a joke.